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Social security and risk sharing
Abstract
In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security
system is ex-ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic overlapping genera- tions economy with capital
accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the
parameters of the economy. In our model, financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria are
interim Pareto e¢ cient. Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is
evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. We examine the
various effects of social security, on the prices of long-lived assets and the stock of capital, and hence on
output, wages and risky rates of returns, can be clearly identified. In addition, we analyze the optimal
size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform.
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1 Introduction
The pay-as-you-go social security system in the US was introduced as a tool to mitigate
the effects of economic crises. In a special message to Congress accompanying the draft of
the social security bill President Roosevelt said “No one can guarantee this country against
the dangers of future depressions, but we can reduce those dangers. ... we can provide the
means of mitigating their results. This plan for economic security is at once a measure of
prevention and a measure of alleviation.” (see e.g. Kennedy (1999), page 270). In this paper
we examine to what extent enhanced intergenerational risk sharing through a pay-as-you-go
social security can alleviate the consequences of economic downturns. This idea dates back
to at least Enders and Lapan (1982). More recently, it is used as an argument against
privatization of social security. For example, Shiller (1999a) writes "If risk management is
to be really effective, it is most important that it help out in the most desperate situations,
and this is what the US government’s social security, financed with income taxes, does."
To properly evaluate whether a social security system allows to improve risk-sharing it is
important to specify the welfare criterion that is used (and hence the market failures social
security may address). If agents’ utility is evaluated at an interim stage, conditionally on
the state at their birth, an improvement can only be obtained if some financial markets are
missing, or the economy is dynamically inefficient. While one might argue that in reality
crucial markets are missing (in particular annuity markets and markets for securities that
pay contingent on idiosyncratic shocks), this source of inefficiency is not specific to economies
with overlapping generations and other insurance schemes could be introduced which are
Pareto-improving (in particular new financial assets, fully funded annuities etc.). Hence
the presence of some missing markets might provide a justification for some government
intervention but does not directly point to social security as an ideal instrument. Using
an interim welfare criterion, several authors have examined the potential benefits of pay-
as-you-go social security systems in realistically calibrated, dynamically efficient economies
with missing markets (see e.g. Imrohoroglu et al. (1999) or Krueger and Kubler (2006)).
They find that the negative effects of social security on the capital stock and wages clearly
outweigh, quantitatively, any positive risk sharing effects of such a system.
However, if agents’ welfare is evaluated at an ex ante stage competitive equilibria in
stochastic overlapping generation models are generally suboptimal, even when markets are
complete, because agents are unable to trade to insure against the realization of the uncer-
tainty at their birth. There must then be some transfers between generations which improve
intergenerational risk sharing and constitute a Pareto-improvement. It is then particularly
of interest to investigate under what conditions a pay-as-you-go social security system (or,
more generally, one-sided transfers from the young to the old) is Pareto-improving according
to an ex ante welfare criterion in economies where equilibria are interim Pareto efficient.
In these economies the only possible source of an improvement is the imperfection in in-
tergenerational risk sharing due to the limitations on trading imposed by the demographic
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structure.
In this paper we consider a class of overlapping generations economies where markets
are complete, there is capital accumulation and land, an infinitely lived asset used in the
production process together with labor and capital. The presence of land together with the
completeness of markets ensure that competitive equilibria are interim Pareto efficient. We
show that, for a wide range of realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy, a
pay-as-you-go social security system is ex-ante Pareto improving and we demonstrate that
the effects on the equilibrium price of land play a crucial role in enhancing the welfare
benefits of social security.
We consider two period overlapping generations economies with a single1 agent per
generation and stochastic shocks to aggregate production, and analyze three different pay-
as-you-go systems: a defined contribution system, where transfers from the young are pro-
portional to their income level, a defined benefits system, where transfers from the young
to the old are state independent, and an ideal system, where any state contingent transfer
from the young to the old is allowed. We decompose the effects of a social security scheme
into: i) a direct transfer from the young to the old (the one prescribed by the scheme),
ii) an indirect transfer (which may have positive or negative sign) induced by the general
equilibrium effects of social security on the stock of capital, and hence on equilibrium wages
and return to capital, and on the price of long lived assets, iii) a change in the level of total
resources available for consumption (due to the change in the stock of capital).
We analyze first these various effects in isolation. This allows us to identify several
conditions (primarily on the covariance between the shocks affecting the agents when young
and old, on their risk aversion, and on the stochastic properties of the production shocks)
under which these different components of the effects of a social security scheme have a
positive effect on welfare. We find that for the direct transfer effect prescribed by a defined
benefits social security system to be Pareto-improving, we need2 consumption (and hence
income) of the old agents to be positively correlated with the consumption of the young
and, at the same time, to exhibit a higher variability. A weaker condition suffices for an
ideal system to be improving.
Next, we consider the general equilibrium effect given by the changes in the price of long-
lived assets. We find that the price of land tends to decrease as a result of the introduction
of social security, so that we have an indirect transfer from young to old agents of negative
sign, which in interim efficient economies has typically a positive effect on the welfare of
future generations. On this basis, we show that the presence of long-lived assets improves
the case for social security, making the conditions for such policy to be welfare improving
1Since we assume markets are complete, perfect risk sharing can be attained within each generation. We
can abstract then from the heterogeneity within each generation so as to better focus on intergenerational
risk sharing.
2 It should be kept in mind that such conditions are derived for competitive equilibria which are interim
efficient.
3
less stringent. Finally we examine the other general equilibrium effects, due to changes
in capital accumulation and hence equilibrium wages and interest rates. The introduction
of social security in dynamically efficient economies tends to crowd out the investment
in capital and hence to lower output level. Furthermore, the stochastic structure of the
production shocks determine the correlation between wages, affecting the income when
young, and return to capital, affecting the income when old. While we are able to identify
some conditions on the properties of the production shocks under which the indirect effect of
various social security schemes due to changes in capital accumulation is welfare improving,
when combined with the direct effect, we show that in general it is rather difficult to find a
rationale of pay-as-you-go social security in models with capital accumulation but without
land.
On this basis, we proceed then to examine the equilibria of the class of economies
considered, where all these effects are combined together. In this case we solve for equilibria
numerically and show that for economies with somewhat realistic parameter specifications
the introduction of a defined contributions as well as that of a defined benefits social security
system is welfare improving. These welfare changes are also decomposed into the various
effects identified in the previous sections and the qualitative analysis carried out there proves
helpful in gaining a better understanding of our results. We find that, while the general
equilibrium effect of social security on the equilibrium level of the stock of capital tends
to decrease welfare, this effect is more than compensated by the effect of the change in
the price of land. The sign (and size) of the direct effect is then crucial for determining
if a (defined benefits or defined contributions) social security scheme is Pareto-improving.
As argued above, this direct effect is positive if the consumption when old is positively
correlated, but sufficiently more volatile, with the consumption when young. These findings
are in accord with our previous qualitative analysis, which then helps us in gaining some
understanding into the welfare effects of social security. In our analysis we assume that
labor is supplied inelastically. Hence our analysis abstracts form another important general
equilibrium effect of social security and the labor supply distortions resulting from such
scheme might be substantial.
In this set-up we also analyze the optimal size of the social security system and evalu-
ate the benefits of reforming an existing social security system to improve its risk-sharing
properties. We find that the welfare gains that can be obtained by reforming a pay-as-you-
go defined contributions system making social security contributions state contingent are
much larger, in the environment considered, than those resulting from the introduction of
the pay-as-you-go system. Such a finding is in line with Shiller (1999b)’s observation that,
the US system’s risk sharing potentials seem limited in that the young’s transfers to the
current old do not depend on the wealth of the young relative to that of the old.
Starting with Gordon and Varian (1988) several papers have examined the scope for
a pay-as-you-go social security system under an ex ante welfare criterion. Shiller (1999b),
Ball and Mankiw (2007) and De Menil et al. (2005) approach this question by using a
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partial equilibrium analysis in that in their model there is no capital accumulation and no
land, and agents have access to a risky storage technology. As argued in this paper, the
general equilibrium effects induced by social security play a very important role in a proper
assessment of the benefits of costs and benefits of social security.
Bohn (2009) (see also Olovsson (2010)) compares the competitive equilibria with and
without social security for a realistically calibrated version of an economy with capital
accumulation. He shows that it is difficult to make an argument in favor of social security
in such set-up. This result, however, depends crucially on the fact that Bohn abstracts from
the presence of long-lived assets and restricts his attention to a specific form of production
shocks, which implies the possibilities for intergenerational risk sharing are rather limited.
We should also point out that, without controlling for the fact that competitive equilibria
without social security are interim efficient it is not possible to properly argue that any
welfare gain is due to the improvements in intergenerational risk sharing induced by social
security.
Imrohoroglu et al. (1999) and Krueger and Kubler (2006) consider realistically calibrated
models with agents that live for many periods. They consider a different welfare criterion
(interim and not ex ante as in this paper) and consider the case where financial markets are
incomplete rather than complete. In Imrohoroglu et al. (1999) as in this paper, land plays an
important role. However, in their paper there are no stochastic shocks to depreciation. Our
theoretical analysis shows the importance of these shocks. Krueger and Kubler (2006) have
stochastic depreciation shocks but do not have land. Under the ex ante welfare criterion, the
presence of land is critical for achieving possible Pareto-improvements via social security,
at least in our setup with two-period lived agents. The results obtained in these papers on
the welfare benefits of a pay-as-you-go social security system are then rather different from
the ones found here.
Anoher distinctive feature of our work with respect to these and most other papers is
our attempt to characterize some properties of an optimal social security scheme.
The effects of other forms of fiscal policy interventions on intergenerational risk sharing
according to an ex ante welfare criterion have been studied by various authors. Gale (1990)
analyzes the efficient design of public debt, while Smetters (2004) examines the role of
capital taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the class of economies and
the various types of social security systems considered, and give conditions for interim and
ex-ante optimality. Section 3 examines the direct effects of such systems and Section 4
the equilibrium effects due to changes in the price of land and in capital accumulation. In
Section 5 we analyze the interaction among all the effects of the alternative social security
schemes for the class of economies under consideration. In Section 6 we examine within the
same framework the optimal size of a social security system as well as the optimal design
of such system and assess the welfare gains of reforming an existing system.
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2 The OLG economy
We consider a stationary overlapping generations economy under uncertainty with 2 period
- lived agents. Time runs from t = 0 to infinity. Each period a shock s ∈ S = {1, ..., S}
realizes. Date-events, or nodes, are histories of shocks, and a specific date event at t is
denoted by st = (s0...st). We collect all (finite) histories in an event tree .
There are 4 commodities: capital, labor, a single consumption good, which is perishable,
and a perfectly durable good, land.
As discussed in the introduction, our primary focus is on intergenerational risk sharing.
We will abstract therefore from issues concerning intragenerational risk sharing by assuming
there is one representative agent born at each date-event. The representative agent in each
generation has a unit endowment of labor when young and zero when old as well as an
endowment of the consumption good which depends on age and the current shock; for an
agent born in node st it is given by ey(st) = eyst when young and e
o(st+1) = eost+1 when
old. At a given node st, we denote the consumption of the young agent by cy(st) and
consumption of the old agent who was born at st−1 by co(st).
Agents’ preferences are only defined over the consumption good and represented by the
time-separable expected utility
U s
t
(cy(st), co(st+1)) = u(cy(st)) + βEstv(c
o(st+1))
where u(.) and v(.) are increasing, concave and smooth functions. Agents supply their labor
inelastically: lys = 1 for all s ∈ S. At the root node, s0 there is one initial old agent with
utility U(co(s0)) = v(co(s0)).
At each date event st, there is a representative firm which produces the consumption
good using capital k, labor l and land b as inputs. The firm’s production function, f , is sub-
ject to stochastic shocks. Given any shock s ∈ S, f(k, l, b; s) is assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale in capital, labor and land. Capital is obtained from the consumption good
in the previous period via a storage technology: more precisely, one unit of the consumption
good at t − 1 yields one unit of capital in each state at t. Land is perfectly durable and
there is a fixed quantity of it, which we normalize to one.
After the shock is realized, the firm buys labor and capital and rents land from the
households on the spot market so as to maximize spot-profits. We denote the price at st
of capital by r(st) (in terms of the consumption good whose price we normalize to 1), the
price of labor by w(st), and the rental price of land by d(st), paid by producers to use land
in the current production process.
At date 0 the initial old holds the entire amount of land as well as a given amount of
capital, k(s−1), to which we refer as the ‘initial condition’. Land is then traded by consumers
in the market and q(st) denotes the price of land at st.
Given an initial condition k(s−1), a feasible allocation is ((cy(st), co(st)), k(st)) such that
cy(st) + co(st) + k(st) ≤ e(st) + f(k(st−1), 1, 1; st) for all s
t,
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where e(st) = eyst + e
o
st denotes the agents’ total endowment of the consumption good at s
t.
For simplicity we abstract from population growth or technological progress and assume
the shocks to be i.i.d.; πs denotes then the probability of shocks s occurring. Evidently,
these are not innocuous assumptions when it comes to a quantitative analysis of social
security. However, in this paper we focus largely on more qualitative issues.
2.1 Optimality
As explained in the introduction, we distinguish between two welfare concepts. Given
an initial condition k(s−1), a feasible allocation ((cy(st), co(st)), k(st))st∈ is conditionally
Pareto optimal (CPO) if there is no other feasible allocation ((∼cy(st), ∼co(st)), ∼k(st))st∈,
with
U s
t
(∼cy(st), ∼co(st+1)) ≥ U s
t
(cy(st), co(st+1)) for all st, t
with the inequality holding strict for at least one st. Thus, in this notion agents’ welfare is
evaluated at the interim stage, after the realization of the uncertainty at the time of birth.
On the other hand, a feasible allocation ((cy(st), co(st)), k(st))st∈ is ex ante Pareto-
optimal3 if there is no other feasible allocation ((∼cy(st), ∼co(st)), ∼k(st))st∈, with
E0U
st(∼cy(st), ∼co(st+1)) ≥ E0U
st(cy(st), co(st+1)) for all t = 0, 1, ...,
where the expectation is evaluated conditionally on the information available at t = 0, with
the inequality holding strict for at least one t.
2.2 Social security
We model social security as a system of non-negative transfers from the young to the old.
In general the pattern of transfers along the event tree is described by (τ(st))st∈, where
τ(st) ≥ 0. We let ν ≥ 0 denote the size of the system, so that at any node st the current
young transfers ντ(st) units of the consumption good to the current old.
Actual social security systems in most developed countries are characterized by the fact
that neither the specification of taxes nor benefits seem to vary across states of the world.
In various countries, like the US, a social security trust-fund stabilizes imbalances between
benefits and contributions over the business cycle. We will abstract from this feature and
not allow for the presence of a trust-fund, so as to focus on the pure intergenerational
transfer component of social security systems, with no possibility of intertemporal smooth-
ing. Evidently, this fact will lead us to underestimate the welfare benefits of social security
systems.
In what follows, we will therefore restrict our attention to stationary social security
systems that maintain budget balance in every period; i.e., current benefits coincide with
current taxes and the specification of the transfer at each node st depends at most on the
3 In the following we will sometimes drop the qualification ‘ex ante’.
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current state st, not on past history. We will consider three different kinds of stationary
social security systems:
1. In the first case, the social security transfer is a suitably designed function of the
current shock. The transfer pattern is thus given by (τ s)s∈S , where τ s can be any
non-negative number: in each state s ∈ S the current young makes then a transfer
proportional to τ s units of the consumption good to the current old. We will refer to
this as an ’ideal’ (stationary) social security system.
2. In the second case the contributions paid by the young are proportional to their
income. Since the latter may vary with the node, so will the level of the tax paid and
the benefits received, but the tax rate (given by ν) is state invariant. That is, for all
st, we have:
τ(st) = eyst + w(s
t).
We will refer to this as a ‘defined contributions ’ (DC) social security system since the
social security tax-rate remains constant across states.
3. In the third case considered in this paper, benefits are state invariant (while the tax
rate, as a fraction of the young’s income, varies with the state) . We call a social
security system a ‘defined benefits’ (DB) one if, for all s ∈ S, τ s = 1.
Feldstein and Liebman (2001) characterize the US pay-as-you-go system as a defined
benefits system and argue that some countries such as Sweden and Italy have defined con-
tribution programs. The fact however that we require transfers to balance in each period
constitutes, as we already argued, a departure from the features of the social security sys-
tems present in most industrialized countries.
The ideal system has indeed more of a normative nature. It describes a situation where
the state dependent structure of the transfers from young to old agents can be optimally
designed so as to maximize welfare. It provides so an important reference point and allows us
to see how far existing defined benefit or contribution systems are from a welfare-maximizing
system.
2.3 Competitive equilibria
A competitive equilibrium is a collection of choices for the households and firms such that
households maximize utility, firms maximize spot profits and markets clear. It simplifies
the characterization of equilibria to note that by market clearing, in equilibrium the repre-
sentative firm will always buy the entire amount available of capital and labor and rent all
the existing land from the households. Recall also that lys = 1 for all s. In the presence of a
social security system (ντ(st))st∈ a competitive equilibrium is then given by a collection of
choices
{
cy(st), co(st), k(st), b(st)
}
st∈
, where b(st) denotes the amount of land purchased
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by the young and k(st) the amount of consumption good destined to capital at st, and
prices
{
w(st), r(st), q(st), d(st)
}
st∈
such that:
i) at each st the young chooses k(st), b(st) to maximize u(cy(st))+βEstv(c
o(st+1)) subject
to
cy(st) = ey(st) + w(s
t)− q(st)b(st)− k(st)− ντ(st)
co(st+1) = eo(st+1) +
(
q(st+1) + d(st+1)
)
b(st) + k(st)r(st+1) + ντ(st+1);
ii) firms maximize profits, i.e. using the market clearing for labor, land and capital,
r(st) =
∂f(k(st−1), 1, 1; st)
∂k
, w(st) =
∂f(k(st−1), 1, 1; st)
∂l
, d(st) =
∂f(k(st−1), 1, 1; st)
∂b
;
iii) and the land market clears:
b(st) = 1.
The presence of an infinitely lived asset like land, yielding each period a dividend that is
bounded away from zero ensures (see, e.g. Demange (2002)) that competitive equilibria are
conditionally Pareto optimal, i.e. there is no possibility of welfare improvement condition-
ally on the state at birth of each generation. Hence the only possible source of inefficiency
in the economy under consideration, when land is productive, is the fact that agents are
unable to trade before they are born to insure against the state at their birth.
We intend to explore under what conditions in such an environment a social security
system, that is a system of transfers from young to old agents of the kinds described in
Section 2.2, allows to improve intergenerational risk sharing and then to generate a welfare
improvement, ex ante. The effects of social security can be decomposed into the direct
intergenerational transfer prescribed by the social security scheme, τ(st)ν, and the effects
generated by the changes in equilibrium prices and capital investment induced by the change
in social security, i.e. its general equilibrium effects.
With regard to the latter, from the specification of the individual budget constraints in
i) above, we see that a change in the price of land q entails a pure transfer to the young
from the old or vice-versa, depending on its sign. A change in the stock of capital, on the
other hand, induces both a redistribution of resources between young and old agents and a
change in the total amount of resources available for consumption. The general equilibrium
effects can thus be decomposed in turn into an indirect intergenerational transfer generated
by the change in q, another indirect transfer generated by the change in k (and hence in
w, r) and a change in total resources available, which we can denote as crowding-out effect
as such change will typically be negative (capital investment typically decreases and, in a
dynamically efficient economy as the one under consideration, so does the output level).
In addition, whenever the equilibrium allocation is non stationary, in the sense that it
depends not only on the current but also on past shocks, so will the general equilibrium
effects described above. We need then to consider also how such effects vary over time and
can refer to such component as the nonstationarity effect.
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2.4 Stationary equilibria
As mentioned above, the analysis is much simpler when the competitive equilibrium is
stationary in the strong sense that individual consumption only depends on the current
shock, s, i.e.
(cy(st), co(st)) = (cyst , c
o
st), ∀s
t.
In such situations we can easily derive the conditions for CPO and ex ante optimality of
competitive equilibria and study the welfare effects of stationary taxes and transfers.
Given our assumption that shocks are i.i.d., stationary equilibria always exist in the
special case where capital is not productive, whether or not land is productive. However as
it is well known this is no longer true, except in some special cases, in the presence of capital
accumulation, when only the existence of ergodic Markov equilibria can be established under
general conditions (see Wang (1993) for a proof of existence in an economy without land).
Conditional optimality
As shown by Aiyagari and Peled (1991), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) (see also
Demange and Laroque (2000) for a model with production), a stationary equilibrium (in the
above sense) is conditionally Pareto optimal if and only if the matrix of the representative
agent’s marginal rate of substitutions
{
βπs′v
′(co
s′
)
u′(cys )
; s, s′ ∈ S
}
has a maximal eigenvalue less
or equal than 1. In our set-up, the separability of the agent’s utility function and the fact
that shocks are i.i.d. imply that this matrix has always rank 1, and its largest eigenvalue is
given by the sum of its diagonal elements. It then follows that a stationary equilibrium is
CPO if and only if:
β
∑
s∈S
πs
v′(cos)
u′(cys)
≤ 1, (1)
a condition that can be readily verified. We can then say the economy is ‘at the golden
rule’ if β
∑
s∈S πs
v′(cos)
u′(cys )
= 1.
It is useful to rewrite condition (1) as follows:
cov(βv′(co),
1
u′(cy)
) + E
(
βv′(co)
)
E
(
1
u′(cy)
)
≤ 1; (2)
which implies, by Jensen’s inequality:
cov(βv′(co),
1
u′(cy)
) + E
(
βv′(co)
)( 1
E(u′(cy))
)
≤ 1. (3)
The advantage of this formulation is that it clearly shows that CPO requires that at least
one of the two following properties is satisfied:
i) on average the marginal utility of consumption when old is smaller than the marginal
utility of consumption when young,
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ii) the marginal utilities of consumption when old and the inverse of the marginal utility
of consumption when young are negatively correlated.
While i) is analogous to the condition for optimality found under certainty (agents
should be on average richer when old than when young, or equivalently the riskless rate
of return should be on average greater than one), ii) identifies some specific properties of
the allocation of risk within each generation. The condition is stated in term of correlation
between marginal utility when old and the inverse of marginal utility when young. This can
be translated into a condition on the stochastic pattern of cy and co if these variables are
co-monotonic, i.e. either cys ≥ c
y
s′ ⇔ c
o
s ≥ c
o
s′ for all s, s
′ or cys ≥ c
y
s′ ⇔ c
o
s ≤ c
o
s′ for all s, s
′.
In this case, condition ii) is equivalent to requiring that cy and co are positively correlated.
Since in the economy considered equilibria are CPO, as we noticed, at least one of
conditions i), ii) must hold (if a stationary equilibrium exists). This has some important
implications for the problem at hand, as we will see in particular in Section 3.2.
Ex Ante Improving Transfers
At a stationary equilibrium agents’ welfare, evaluated at the ex ante stage, is the same
for all generations and given by:
E0U
st(cy(st), co(st+1)) =
∑
s∈S
πs(u(c
y
s) + βv(c
o
s)).
We derive in what follows a simple condition under which a stationary allocation cannot be
improved by direct stationary transfers between young and old agents. Considering direct,
stationary transfers is only a necessary condition for the ex ante optimality of an allocation,
as a welfare improvement could be found also by changing the level of production and
investment, as well as with nonstationary transfers. Since our focus is on the possibility
that a stationary social security system is welfare improving, it is of particular interest
to consider first the conditions where an improvement can be found only with stationary
transfers.
Welfare improving stationary transfers do not exist if there isn’t a vector (Ts)s∈S such
that an infinitesimal net transfer from the young to the old agents in the direction of (Ts)s∈S
has a (weakly) positive effect on the (ex ante) welfare of the representative generation:∑
s∈S
πs(−u
′(cys) + βv
′(cos))Ts ≥ 0 (4)
as well as on the agents who are old when the transfers are introduced:∑
s∈S
πsv
′(cos)Ts ≥ 0. (5)
with one at least of the two inequalities being strict.
Obviously, a vector (Ts)s∈S satisfying conditions (4) and (5) exists if, for some s,
(−u′(cys) + βv′(cos)) > 0. Moreover, one can easily see that, since the transfers (Ts)s∈S
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are not restricted to be positive, an improvement is also possible if the vectors of the mar-
ginal utilities when young and old are not collinear. Therefore we have:
Proposition 1 At any stationary allocation
(
cys , cos′
)
s,s′∈S
, a necessary and sufficient condition
for the non-existence of welfare improving stationary transfers is that the vectors (u′(cys))s∈S
and (v′(cos)s∈S) are collinear and that for all s ∈ S , βv
′(cos) ≤ u
′(cys).
Condition (4) can be rewritten as follows:
Cov
{
βv′(co)− u′(cy), T
}
≥ E (T )
[
E
(
u′(cy)
)
− βE
(
v′(co)
)]
(6)
Thus an improving transfer T should be characterized by a sufficiently high covariance with
v′(co) and a low covariance with u′(cy).
In what follows, however, we will not allow for any possible transfer but only for those
transfers which can be generated via a social security system. When a stationary equilibrium
exists the transfers prescribed by the stationary social security systems specified above
are also stationary. In most of the analysis we will focus our attention on the welfare
effects of the introduction of a social security system, of one of the three types described
above, at an infinitesimally small scale, that is an increase of the scale of the social security
system, dν > 0, starting from a level ν = 0.4. We show that the economy reaches a new
stationary equilibrium in at most one period after the change in the social security system.
Furthermore, the welfare effects are only given by the effects of the total transfers generated
by the infinitesimal policy change. These transfers can be described by a vector (Ts)s∈S
where, in each state s ∈ S, Ts is given by the sum of the direct transfer τ s prescribed
by the policy, always non negative, and of the indirect transfer which may be induced by
the general equilibrium effects of the policy change (the changes in q and k), which may
be positive or negative. Once the pattern (Ts)s∈S of the total transfers induced by an
infinitesimal increase of the scale of a social security scheme (τ s)s∈S is identified, we can
use the analysis in this section to ascertain whether or not such policy changes improve
welfare (in the ex ante sense). For this, it suffices to verify whether conditions (4) and (5)
are satisfied. We will then discuss the optimal size as well as the optimal design of the
system in the final section.
Remark 1 The Timing of the Intervention. When ex ante welfare is considered the timing
of the introduction of the transfers also plays a role. In particular, (5) applies to
the case where the transfer scheme starts operating at a given date in all possible
states. We can understand this as describing a situation where the transfer scheme is
announced one period in advance, say at the end of some date t, after some history
st, and will be implemented starting from date t + 1 at every successor node of st
(hence there will be a transfer from the young to the old at date t+1 for each possible
4 It should be clear however that our findings can be immediately extended to the case where the policy
change is evaluated at some ν > 0.
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realization s of the uncertainty at date t+ 1).
If on the other hand the transfer scheme were not announced in advance, but began
to operate at date t+1, when say the current shock is s, the scheme would be welfare
improving if the following conditions hold, in addition to (4):
πsv
′(cos)Ts ≥ 0, (7)
saying that the agents who are old at t+ 1 are not worse off, and:
−u′(cys)Ts +
∑
s∈S
βπsv
′(cos))Ts ≥ 0. (8)
stating that the agents who are young at t + 1 are also not worse off. Note that (7)
is equivalent to Ts ≥ 0, and given this it follows from (8) that (5) holds. The reverse
however is not necessarily true. We conclude that the set of transfer schemes which
are welfare improving when announced one period before their introduction includes
the set of transfer schemes which are improving when they are introduced at the time
of their announcement.
3 Direct Effects of Social Security
To gain some understanding over the factors at play, and in particular the welfare conse-
quences of the various effects identified in Section 2.3 above, it will be useful to analyze each
of them in isolation. This will allow us to derive some qualitative results on the conditions
under which they are, or are not, beneficial. To this end in this and the next section we will
consider some special cases of the economy described above where a stationary equilibrium
exists. These results will also help us to gain some understanding for the numerical findings
in the last two sections.
First, to examine the welfare consequences of the direct transfer effect of the policy
scheme we will consider the case where no factor is productive5, without land, and the
economy reduces to a pure exchange one. In this case there is a unique equilibrium, which
is stationary and given by autarky6. While this case is almost trivial to analyze, it helps in
identifying some of the main conditions needed for social security to be Pareto-improving.
In this case in fact the total net transfer Ts induced by the policy in equilibrium in any state
s coincides with the direct transfer τ s prescribed by the policy. The welfare consequences
of social security can then just be determined on the basis of the stochastic relationship
between the direct transfers (τ s)s∈S and the agents’ marginal utility for consumption (in
this case coinciding with their endowments). In the light of the discussion at the end of
the previous section, we consider the case where the introduction of the social security
5That is, ∂f(k, l, b; s)/∂k = ∂f(k, l, b; s)/∂l = ∂f(k, l, b; s)/∂b = 0 for all b, l, k and s.
6That is, no trade: c = e.
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scheme is announced one period in advance. Hence to determine whether the scheme is
Pareto improving, we only have to verify that conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied when Ts
is replaced by τ s, for all s: ∑
s∈S
πs(−u
′(eys) + βv
′(eos))τ s > 0,∑
s∈S
πsv
′(cos)τ s ≥ 0,
(one of the two inequalities being strict).
Since the direct transfers τ s from young to old agents prescribed by a social security
scheme are required to be non-negative, the initial old are always at least weakly better off
as a result of the introduction of the scheme (τ(s))s∈S , i.e. the second of the two above
inequalities is always satisfied.
3.1 Ideal social security system
All what is required for the existence of a Pareto improving ideal social security system
is that the first of the two above conditions holds. The circumstances under which this is
possible are readily obtained:
Proposition 2 At an autarkic equilibrium, a Pareto improving ideal social security system
exists if and only if there is at least one state s for which
βv′(eos) > u
′(eys).
Intuitively this is a very weak condition: it only requires the existence of one state,
where the time (but not probability) discounted marginal utility of the old is larger than
the marginal utility of the young, i.e. where we can say the old are ’poorer’ than the young.
It is useful to contrast this condition with the necessary and sufficient condition (1) for
the conditional optimality of the competitive equilibrium which, as we noticed, requires that
on average the old are ’richer’ than the young, or alternatively that cov(βv′(co), 1
u′(cy)) < 0.
As long as there is one shock s for which the old are ’poorer’ than the young (a property
valid for a large subset of the economies for which the (autarkic) equilibrium is CPO) we
can find a Pareto-improving social security system. The improvement can be attained with
nonzero transfers from the young to the old only in that one state s. Hence, for all s 6= s
the young agents are better off conditionally on the state at birth; if the initial allocation
is CPO the agents born in state s must be worse off with social security.
3.2 Defined benefits
The conditions under which the direct transfer effect is welfare improving for more realistic
systems as DB or DC are clearly more restrictive. In particular, in the case of a DB system,
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where transfers are constant across all shocks, we find a surprising necessary condition for
this to be the case.
The necessary and sufficient condition for a defined benefits system to be Pareto im-
proving, at an autarkic equilibrium, is again readily obtained from (4), setting Ts = 1 for
all s: ∑
s∈S
πs
(
−u′(eys) + βv
′(eos)
)
> 0. (9)
Thus the average marginal utility of consumption has to be larger when old than when
young. If this is the case, i.e. if E (βv′(co))
(
1
Eu′(cy)
)
≥ 1, the necessary condition for CPO,
given by equation (3), implies that cov(βv′(co), 1
u′(cy)) < 0, that is condition ii), must hold
for the allocation to be CPO.
In addition, we can rewrite (9) as:
∑
s∈S
πsu
′(eys)
(
−1 + β
v′(eos)
u′(eys)
)
= E
(
u′(ey)
)
E
(
−1 + β
v′(eo)
u′(ey)
)
+Cov
(
u′(ey), β
v′(eo)
u′(ey)
)
> 0.
(10)
Since the necessary and sufficient condition for CPO, (1), requires that E
(
−1 + β v
′(eo)
u′(ey)
)
≤
0, the second term in (10) has to be strictly positive for (9) to hold.
We have thus shown:
Proposition 3 At a conditionally Pareto optimal autarkic equilibrium, a defined benefits social
security system can be Pareto improving only if:
cov(βv′(eo),
1
u′(ey)
) < 0 < cov(u′(ey), β
v′(eo)
u′(ey)
). (11)
The first inequality in (11) says that a welfare improving defined benefits system can
only be found when the marginal utility of the old and the inverse of the marginal utility of
the young are negatively correlated. The second inequality requires that u′(ey) and v
′(eo)
u′(ey)
are positively correlated. Hence, when the variables describing the endowments when young
and when old vary co-monotonically, marginal utilities when young and when old must be
positively correlated and the latter must exhibit a greater variability than the first one.
Thus, in all states where the old are rich, the young must also be rich and vice versa!
This may come a bit as a surprise as we might have expected that the margins for welfare
improving transfers between young and old, enhancing risk sharing, would be greater when
their income is negatively correlated. We should bear in mind though that we are limiting
our attention here to deterministic transfers, so that mutual insurance cannot be properly
achieved; moreover, the conditional optimality of the equilibrium imposes some restrictions
on the pattern of the variability of consumption when young and when old. The larger
variability in the marginal utility when old then tells us that the old are bearing more risk
than the young and it is beneficial for the young to provide them some insurance, even in
the form of a deterministic transfer of income.
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4 Price Effects
4.1 Long-lived Assets
We turn now our attention to the general equilibrium effects of the introduction of a social
security system. We examine first the effect on the price of long-lived assets such as land.
Hence we maintain the restriction that capital and labor are not productive but suppose
now that land is productive, and constitutes an infinitely-lived asset in unit net supply
paying each period a dividend ds ≡ ∂f(0, 1, 1; s)/∂b whenever shock s realizes.
In the presence of land a stationary equilibrium still exists both without and with a
(stationary) social security system. We still consider the case where the introduction of
social security is announced at some date t, after some history st, and after all trades have
taken place at that date, and will start being implemented from date t+1, at every successor
node of st; at t+ 1 the price of land q varies and settles immediately at its new stationary
equilibrium level. 7
The net transfer Ts induced by the introduction of social security is now equal to the
sum of the direct transfer τ s prescribed by it and the indirect transfer induced by the change
in the equilibrium price of land (the price effect). Since the total outstanding amount of
land is 1, we have:
Ts = τ s +
dqs
dν
.
Under normality conditions for consumers’ land demand, the price effect is always negative
and the size of this effect, in absolute value, is positively correlated with consumption when
young.
The negative sign of the indirect transfer, combined with the positive one of the direct
transfer, allows to generate a richer pattern of transfers between young and old and hence to
make an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing easier, as illustrated by the following:
Example 1 Agents have a constant relative risk aversion utility function with coefficient of
risk aversion σ = 2, u(c) = v(c) = −c−1, and β = 1. There are 2 states with π1 = π2 = 0.5
and land’s dividends are deterministic: d1 = d2 = 0.05. Let e
y
1 = 1, e
y
2 = 2, e
o
1 = 0.1, e
o
2 = 1.
The first two columns of Table 1 below show the equilibrium consumption allocation as well as
the prices of land. Note that consumption when old and when young are positively correlated
and consumption when old is more volatile.
In this economy the introduction of a defined contributions PAYGO system at the scale ν = 0.01
(i.e. a social security tax of 1 percent of young agents’ income eys in each state s whose revenue
is paid to the current old) is Pareto-improving. In the third column of Table 1 we see the effect
of this scheme on the equilibrium price of land: the price of land always decreases and the
magnitude of its change is larger in state 2, when young agents’ consumption is higher. The
7The timing is even more crucial here, as announcing the policy more than one period before its intro-
duction also matters. Still, we can show that the timing considered is the optimal one.
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large drop in the land price in state 2 leads to a reversal of the sign of the transfer — the total
transfer to the old induced by this policy is positive in state 1 and negative in state 2. Thus we
have a transfer from the young to the old in state 1 (where the young are richer) and from the
old to the young in state 2 (where the old are richer), with a clear improvement in intergenera-
tional risk sharing. Even though the direct transfer to the old agents is positively correlated with
the old’s consumption, the total transfer is negatively correlated with it (the indirect transfer
induced by the price effect proves stronger than the direct transfer prescribed by the policy) -
thus helping the old in hedging their risk. The total transfer is then also negatively correlated
with consumption when young, so the young will face altogether more risk, but as we noticed
their consumption was less volatile than that of the young to begin with. As a consequence, it
can be verified that both the initial old and all future generations gain.
The results for a defined benefit system (of size τ s = 1), reported in the last column, are similar.
States cy co q T(0.01) defined contrib. T(0.01) defined benefit
1 0.635 0.515 0.365 0.001 (q1 = −0.009) 0.001 (q1 = −0.009)
2 1.037 2.013 0.967 -0.001 (q2 = −0.021) -0.004 (q2 = −0.014)
Table 1: Social security with land.
4.2 Capital and Output
The second general equilibrium effect of social security concerns the levels of capital and
output, and then wages and return to capital. To isolate these effects we consider here
the case where capital and labor are productive but there is no land and agents have no
endowments of the consumption good. Since young agents supply inelastically their (unit)
endowment of labor and land is not productive, we can write f(k, s) to denote the firm’s
production function f(k, 1, 1, s); its first and second derivatives with respect to k are then
denoted by fk(k, s) and fkk(k, s), its derivative with respect to l by fl(k, s) and the cross
derivative by fkl(k, s).
If the equilibrium is conditionally Pareto optimal, and if the introduction of a pay-as-
you-go social security system leads to a reduction in savings, the stock of capital and hence
aggregate equilibrium output and consumption will be lower for future generations. At
the same time, under uncertainty these changes also affect risk sharing and, when output is
subject to productivity shocks, their properties contribute in an important way to determine
the pattern of the correlation between consumption when old and when young and to the
stochastic structure of the indirect transfers generated by social security.
We consider here the case where agents’s preferences are linear concave, i.e. u(x) = x
and v(x) concave, which ensures that a stationary equilibrium still exists8, both without
and with a (stationary) social security system. The transition to the new steady state is
8With capital accumulation this is no longer true with general preferences.
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now not immediate but takes one period. If social security is introduced at some time
t,9 in that period the current old receive the direct transfers, but there is no additional
transfer induced by general equilibrium effects since the stock of capital is determined by
the previous period’s savings decisions. The new steady state is reached at t + 1 when
capital and hence prices also change10 and there is so also an indirect transfer.
Let k denote the level of savings of an agent when young (or, equivalently, the amount
invested in the firms’ technology, which will yield the same amount of capital next period).
Since shocks are i.i.d., the first order condition for the consumer of the representative
generation at a stationary equilibrium is
−1 + β
∑
s∈S
πsfk(k, s)v
′(fk(k, s)k + ντ s) = 0. (12)
We see from (12) that the agents’ supply of capital is state invariant. As a consequence
the stationary equilibrium is characterized by a constant amount of capital.
The effect on the equilibrium stock of capital of the introduction of an infinitesimal
amount of social security is then:
kν =
∂k
∂ν
= −
∑
s∈S πsfk(k, s)v
′′(cos)τ s∑
s∈S πs[fkk(k, s)v
′(cos) + fk(k, s)(fkk(k, s)k + fk(k, s))v
′′(cos)]
.
where cos is again the equilibrium level of consumption of the representative agent when old
before the introduction of social security, now given by cos = fk(k, s)k. Observe that this
effect is negative whenever fkkk
fk
≥ −1, a condition that in the rest of this section we will
assume is always satisfied11.
What is the effect of the change in k on the level of the young and old agents’ consump-
tion? For the young, since the equilibrium wage is given by fl and c
y
s = fl(k, s) − k, it is
(flk(k, s)− 1) kν , while for the old it is (fk(k, s) + kfkk(k, s)) kν . The constant returns to
scale property of the production function implies that kfkk = −flk. Hence the total change
in the amount of resources available for consumption of the agents when young is:
−τ s − kν (kfkk(k, s) + 1) , (13)
and for the old it is:
τ s + kν (kfkk(k, s) + fk(k, s)) . (14)
Note that in this case the changes do not add to zero, but to kν(fk(k, s)−1), thus we do
not only have a transfer but a change in available resources. Since, whenever competitive
9Whether or not the policy were previously announced does not matter in this case.
10Due to the absence of income effects, because, of the assumed quasilinearity of preferences, the transition
only takes one period.
11The condition is equivalent to capital income, fkk, being increasing in k and is always satisfied, for
instance, by Cobb-Douglas and in fact by all CES production functions as long as the elasticity of substitution
is not too small.
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equilibria are CPO we have12 E(fk) > 1, we see that the introduction of social security,
by reducing the stock of capital, also lowers the expected value of output and average
consumption.
However, as long as the policy is introduced at an infinitesimal level, the welfare con-
sequences of the induced change in output are zero, by the envelope theorem. The first
order conditions for an agent’s optimum (12) imply that the effect on the agent’s expected
utility of increasing consumption when young by dν and lowering it when old by fk(k, s)dν
in each state s ∈ S is zero. Thus, in evaluating the welfare consequences of the changes in
the consumption when young and old given in (13) and (14) we can ignore the last term,
so that the overall effect of the policy is a pure transfer effect from the young to the old,
given by:
Ts = τ s + kνkfkk(k, s), (15)
which is strictly positive for all s.13
On the basis of the above argument, equation (4) can still be used (now with T as
in (15)) to evaluate whether or not the introduction of a social security scheme is welfare
improving. We see from (15) that the indirect transfer induced by the policy has always a
positive sign, the opposite of what we found in the case of land, and varies with the state,
according to the stochastic properties of fkk. The fact that the indirect transfer is always
non-negative makes the possibility of an improvement harder (since the overall transfer
will then also be non-negative in every state, which limits the possibilities of improving
intergenerational risk sharing; moreover, at conditionally Pareto efficient allocations, since
the marginal utility tends to be smaller when old than when young it is easier to improve
the welfare of the representative generation with a transfer from the old to the young).
The stochastic properties of the indirect transfer, which depend on how the technology
shocks affect fkk, also matter. To see this more precisely, notice first that the necessary
and sufficient condition for the introduction of social security to improve the utility of the
representative generation at the new stationary equilibrium is obtained by substituting (15)
for T in equation (4): ∑
s∈S
πs(−1 + βv
′(cos)) (τ s + kνkfkk(k, s)) > 0. (16)
As discussed above, the initial old cannot lose since they only obtain the direct transfer.
For the initial young (i.e. born in the period social security is introduced, before the new
12Recalling the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be CPO, with linear - concave
preferences given by 1 ≥ β
∑
s∈S
πsv
′(cos), and using the first order conditions for the agents’ optimization
problem, (12), we obtain −Cov(βv′(co), fk) ≤ E(fk) − 1. Since c
o = fkk, the variables v
′(co) and fk are
clearly comonotonic and negatively correlated, so we get E(fk) > 1.
13We should stress that the above property follows from the fact that we are considering the introduction
of an infinitesimal amount of social security, starting from a situation where its level is zero. When a discrete
change in policy is considered the welfare consequences of the change in the output level, and hence in the
resources available for consumption, have also to be taken into account. This will become clear in the next
section.
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steady state is reached) the analogous condition is obtained:
−
∑
s∈S
πsτ s +
∑
s∈S
πsβv
′(cos) (τ s + kνkfkk(k, s)) > 0, (17)
and is always satisfied whenever (16) holds, since kν is negative. Hence in the presence of
production, to find an improvement it suffices to consider equation (16).
Having determined in (15) the value of the total transfer associated to any social security
scheme, by a similar argument to the one of the proof of Proposition 3 we can show that a
necessary condition for scheme (τ s)s∈S to be welfare improving is:
cov(βv′(fkk) (τ + kνkfkk) ,
1
τ + kνkfkk
) < 0 < cov(τ + kνkfkk, βv
′(fkk)). (18)
From (18) we see that:
Proposition 4 At a CPO equilibrium with production, when preferences are linear - concave:
- an improving defined benefits social security system only exists if the production shocks
are such that (−fkk) and v
′(co) are positively correlated;
- an improving defined contributions system only exists if either (−fkk) or w = f − fkk, is
positively correlated with v′(co).
When fk and fkk are co-monotonic, the above necessary condition for defined benefits to
be improving is equivalent to the condition that (−fkk) and fkk are negatively correlated.
A similar property holds for defined contribution.
On this basis we can look at various alternative specification of the production function,
and in particular of the form of the technology shocks. We examine first the case of TFP
shocks, with a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share α ∈ (0, 1):
f(k, s) = ξsk
α, s ∈ S.
Note that in this case fk = αk
α−1ξ, −fkk = α(1 − α)k
α−2ξ and w = (1 − α)kαξ are all
perfectly and positively correlated, so the above necessary conditions are all violated, which
implies that neither defined benefits nor defined contributions can ever be improving in
this set-up. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that with TFP shocks the marginal
utility when old and the total transfer-payment induced by a defined benefits or defined
contributions scheme are negatively correlated: when the old are rich, the transfer-payment
is high and vice-versa.
Alternatively, consider the case where technological shocks are given by a combination
of shocks to the depreciation rate of capital and of TFP shocks:
f(k, s) = ξsk
α + (1− δs)k, s ∈ S (19)
The variables −fkk = α(1−α)k
α−2ξ and v′(fkk) = v
′(ξαkα+k(1−δ))may now be positively
correlated if ξ and 1− δ are sufficiently negatively correlated.
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We assumed so far that the agents’ utility is linear-concave. When on the other hand
the utility is strictly concave both with respect to the consumption when young and when
old, the stochastic structure of the production shocks also affects the correlation between
the marginal utility of consumption when young and when old which, as we saw in Section
3, plays a crucial role for the welfare effects of social security. Since in such case equilibria
are no longer strictly stationary, a proper examination of it is postponed to the next section.
5 Combining all the effects
We now investigate whether the introduction of some social security scheme is Pareto im-
proving in more realistic set-ups where there is production which uses labor, capital and
land as inputs. The environment is the one described in Section 2. As no stationary equi-
librium exists for this model, we have to compute equilibria numerically (we describe the
algorithm in the Appendix).
Since we consider economies with two period - lived agents (i.e. a period corresponds
to 30 years) and without population or technology growth it is not possible to properly
calibrate the model to match historic prices and quantities. However, we still want to
consider a specification of preferences and technology which is ‘roughly consistent’ with the
specifications of stochastic OLG models in the existing literature which take a period to
be 20-40 years (e.g. Bohn (2009), Smetters (2004) or, to some extent, Constantinides et al
(2002)).
In the base-line case, there are 4 i.i.d. shocks, s = 1, ..., 4, preferences are age-invariant
and exhibit constant relative risk aversion, u(c) = v(c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ), with β = 1 and
σ = 2 (we consider a more standard value for β below). In order to allow for the possibility
of different patterns for the correlation of returns to capital and wages, we consider a
specification of the production shocks as at the end of the previous section, where there is
stochastic depreciation, in addition to TFP shocks14:
f(k, l, b; s) = ξsk
αlγb1−α−γ + (1− δs)k, s = 1, . . . , 4.
Consistently with the existing literature (e.g. Imrohoroglu et al. (1999)) we consider
α = 0.28 and γ = 0.69, i.e. the land share is 3 percent, the capital share 28 percent. We
fix the TFP shocks to be ξ1 = ξ2 = 1.15, ξ3 = ξ4 = 0.85 and the depreciation shocks to
be δ1 = δ3 = δ + ζ and δ2 = δ4 = δ − ζ. We set average depreciation δ to equal 0.9.
Given an average annual depreciation of 5-6 percent as in Smetters (2004) or Krueger and
Kubler (2006), this is a bit too low for a 30-year time-interval (it corresponds more to 7
percent); however, as already noticed a literal interpretation of δ as depreciation is difficult,
14Such specification was earlier considered by Smetters (2004) and Krueger and Kubler (2006). We should
stress that the linear term appearing in it should not necessarily be taken literally as describing capital
depreciation but rather as capturing more generally situations where the correlation of the returns to capital
and labor is not perfect.
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especially in a model with two period - lived agents, and the number we use is still within
what is used in the literature. The size of the TFP shocks is roughly consistent with what
is usually assumed in the literature, and so is the resulting coefficient of variation of wages.
In Sections 5.1.1 and 5.4 below we discuss how sensitive our findings are with respect to the
specification of the size of the TFP shocks, of the average depreciation and of the preference
parameters.
Given our previous analysis, it is clear that the welfare implications of different social
security schemes will crucially depend on the vector (π, ζ), i.e. on the size of the depreciation
shocks and the correlation properties of TFP and depreciation shocks, since this will govern
the pattern of the volatilities and covariance of consumption when old and consumption
when young. In the following we will show how different values for this vector will result in
different welfare implications.
As mentioned above, given the simplicity of our model, we cannot properly choose these
parameters to ‘match the data.’ First, it is not clear what ‘the data’ are since it is not pos-
sible to obtain good estimates of prices or quantities for 30-year periods. Secondly, it is well
known that it is impossible to match both the Sharpe ratio and the volatility of consumption
in this model. Smetters (2004) who matches average returns (and considers a model very
similar to ours) takes ζ to be around 5, which in turn leads to unrealistically high consump-
tion volatility. In this paper we consider therefore a variety of different parameter specifi-
cations: three possible values for the size of the depreciation shock, ζ ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and three
specifications of the probabilities, π ∈ {(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0), (0, 1/2, 0, 1/2)},
describing the cases where TFP (ξ) and depreciation (1− δ) shocks are, respectively inde-
pendent, positively and negatively correlated. For each value of the ’variable parameters’
(π, ζ), we compute the competitive equilibrium and evaluate the welfare effects of introduc-
ing different types of social security systems.
In order to argue that these specifications are somewhat reasonable we do discuss how the
equilibrium prices and quantities in our examples relate to equilibrium prices and quantities
other authors recover from the available data.
5.1 Equilibrium prices and allocations
We report in Table 2 the resulting summary statistics for the equilibrium values of average
returns to capital, coefficient of variation of returns, coefficient of variation of aggregate
consumption and wages, the riskfree rate and correlation of returns and wages for the
different specifications of the parameters (π, ζ). These values can then be compared to the
values considered in the literature. Smetters (2004) compounds estimated average yearly
returns and takes the average return to capital to be 1056 percent (for a 30-year horizon,
this corresponds to 8.5 percent p.a.), and the coefficient of variation to be 0.87. He also
estimates the correlation between returns and wage-income to be 0.75 and takes the risk-
free rate to be 143 percent. Constantinides et al. (2002) take the coefficient of variation
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of wages to be 0.25 (for a 20-year horizon) and the coefficient of variation of consumption
to be 0.20. From now on, we refer to these values as ‘the data’. We will not match any
of these numbers in our specifications below, but it is instructive to see how the different
choices of the parameters could be judged more or less realistic, depending on the resulting
pattern of the equilibrium values.
In the table and the rest of the analysis, we use ind to refer to the specification
π = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4), where the two technology shocks are independent, pos for π =
(0, 0.5, 0.5, 0), where the shocks are positively correlated and neg for π = (0.5, 0, 0, 0.5),
where they are negatively correlated. Similarly, zero for ζ = 0, where there are no depreci-
ation shocks, small for ζ = 1 and large15 for ζ = 2. Since for ζ = 0 the equilibria are the
same for the three values of π, in this case we only report the results for (ζ, π) = (zero,ind).
(ζ, π)
avg return
on capital
coeffvar
return
coeffvar
wages
coeffvar
agg. consumption
avg risk-
free rate
corr. returns
wages
(zero,ind) 1.32 0.05 0.20 0.25 1.26 0.27
(small,ind) 1.84 0.54 0.19 0.29 1.09 0.08
(large,ind) 2.71 0.74 0.18 0.30 1.02 0.10
(small,pos) 2.02 0.57 0.19 0.38 1.005 0.996
(large,pos) 2.96 0.76 0.17 0.40 0.98 0.999
(small,neg) 1.67 0.56 0.19 0.04 1.29 -0.9998
(large,neg) 2.31 0.79 0.18 0.054 1.10 -0.9998
‘Data ’ 10.57 0.87 0.25 0.20 1.43 0.75
Table 2: Summary statistics of equilibrium values
As we see from the table, in all specifications we are far from matching the average
return to capital or its variation. The risk-free rate is not too far off, so the problem is
obviously that Sharpe ratio and equity premium cannot be achieved. However, it is also
clear that higher values of ζ lead to more realistic values for these statistics. At the same
time, they lead to unrealistically high coefficients of variation in aggregate consumption,
except when shocks are perfectly negatively correlated. Specification π = neg yields very
low variation in consumption but also a correlation between wages and returns of about
−1, which is quite unrealistic. We consider this case because it allows us to identify what
role the correlation plays for the welfare effects of social security. On the other hand, when
probabilities are given by pos the correlation of returns and wages is excessively high, but
this case is still interesting given the fact that part of the literature takes that correlation
to be significantly positive.
15Even though, as argued above, such value is not really large with respect to those considered in other
papers, as Smetters (2004).
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The table also reports the risk-free rate, i.e. the return on a one-period bond. Intuitively,
the smaller this number, the closer the economy is to dynamic inefficiency.16 We will see
below that the crowding out effect of social security depends crucially on this level of the
risk-free rate.
Given the analysis in the previous sections, it is also of interest to know the implications
of the correlation of returns and wages for the correlation of consumption when young and
consumption when old. We report its values below for the case where the depreciation shock
takes its intermediate value:
(small,ind) (small,pos) (small,neg)
0.4897 0.9856 -0.8374
5.1.1 Sensitivity analysis for returns
Given that for all our specifications average returns to capital are so far off from what is
observed in the data, it is useful to ask whether different specifications of the preference
parameters allow to get somewhat closer. In the sensitivity analysis below we consider a
lower value of the discount factor and higher risk aversion coefficient, β = 0.44 and σ = 4.
We also consider a lower value for depreciation, namely 0.8 which corresponds to around
5 percent annually. Intuitively this should help to generate more realistic asset prices.
However, as we see in the following table, the effects on returns prove to be fairly small.
We focus on the case where π is given by ind and report in the table the average returns to
capital and the average riskfree rate for various specifications of ζ, β and σ:
(ζ, β, σ, δ) Avg. return to capital Avg. risk-free rate
(1,1,2,0.8) 1.86 1.13
(1,0.44,2,0.9) 1.99 1.23
(1,0.44,2,0.8) 2.02 1.26
(1,0.44,4,0.9) 2.11 1.00
(2,0.44,4,0.9) 3.38 0.99
Returns to capital increase with higher risk-aversion and lower values of β but the effects
are quantitatively rather small. The effects of lowering the average depreciation are quite
negligible.
5.2 Decomposing direct and indirect effects
Since we approximate equilibria numerically, we will consider a small but discrete change
in the size of the social security system, starting from a zero level. As described in Sections
2 and 4.1 above, we assume that the social security policy starts operating after the end
16Since the table reports average returns, a number smaller than 1 (as in (ζ, π) = (large, pos)) does not
imply dynamic inefficiency.
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of a given period, at all possible direct successor nodes (i.e. for all realizations of the
shocks). Its introduction is not anticipated at the previous date. We trace the effects of
the introduction of the policy along the event tree. We report welfare gains and losses (in
wealth equivalents — the exact computations of welfare changes is reported in the Appendix)
for the current generation and for the next 6 generations. After 5-6 periods welfare changes
seem to stabilize.
In order to understand the sources of these welfare changes for the generations far in
the future, we consider a first order approximation of such changes and decompose it, as
already explained in Section 2.2, into changes induced by intergenerational transfers (in
turn divided into direct and indirect transfers), changes induced by the crowding-out of
capital investment and changes due to nonstationarity. The fact that we consider a discrete
variation from zero to positive social security contributions implies that the welfare effects
of the changes in the output level can no longer be ignored.
Suppose social security is introduced immediately after some node st
′
. For all t >
t′, denote the consumption in the equilibrium without social security by c(st) and the
consumption in the equilibrium with social security by ∼c(st). Denote the total transfer
to the old (given by the sum of the direct and indirect effects of the policy) as T o(st) =
∼co(st) − co(st) and the one from the young by T y(st) = cy(st) − ∼cy(st). In the presence
of capital, we also need to define the total change in the level of aggregate consumption,
L(st) = T o(st) − T y(st). A first order approximation of the effects of the introduction of
social security on the welfare of generation t is given by:
Es0
{(
−u′(cy(st, st+1)) + βv
′(co(st, st+1))
)
T y(st, st+1)
}
+ (20)
Es0
{
βu′(co(st, st+1))[T
o
(
st, st+1
)
− T y
(
st, st+1
)
]
}
+ (21)
Es0
{
−u′(cy(st))T y
(
st
)
+ u′(cy(st, st+1))T
y
(
st, st+1
)}
(22)
The last term, (22), captures the welfare effect due to non-stationarity, i.e. the difference
between the effect on the young agents of generation t and the one on the agents who will be
young at date t+ 1. Under the assumption that there exists a ergodic Markov equilibrium,
as t→∞, this last term tends to zero because for any ergodic Markov process (xt) we have
that E0xt − E0xt+1 → 0
The second term, (21), captures the welfare effect of the change in the aggregate level
of resources available for consumption as a result of the policy (crowding-out effect):
C(t) = Es0
{
βu′(co(st+1))L(st+1)
}
.
Finally, the first term, (20), measures the welfare effect of the total transfer from the
young to the old at date t + 1. This term can be decomposed further noting that the
total transfer from the young T y(st+1) is in turn equal to τ(st+1)+q(st+1)+ [k(st+1)−
w(st+1)]. τ(st+1) is the direct transfer prescribed by the social security scheme, q(st+1)
the indirect transfer induced by the change in the price of land (i.e. it is the difference
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between the price of land with and without social security), and [k(st+1) −w(st+1)] is
the indirect transfer induced by the change in the stock of capital (i.e. by the changes in
the equilibrium levels of wages and savings). As a consequence we obtain:
Es0
{(
−u′(cy(st, st+1)) + βv
′(co(st, st+1))
)
T y
(
st, st+1
)}
= Dd(t) +Dq(t) +Dk(t)
with
Dd(t) = Es0
{(
−u′(cy(st, st+1) + βv
′(co(st, st+1)
)
)τ(st+1)
}
Dq(t) = Es0
{(
−u′(cy(st, st+1) + βv
′(co(st, st+1))
)
)q(st+1)
}
Dk(t) = Es0
{(
−u′(cy(st, st+1)) + βv
′(co(st, st+1)
)
)(k(st+1)−w(st+1)
}
These are the three effects we discussed in Sections 3, 4.1 and 4.2.
In our computations, the changes are not infinitesimal and we cannot compute Dd(t),
Dq(t), Dk(t) and C(t) as t→∞. Nevertheless, it turns out that after 6 periods the changes
in these numbers are very small. We can then report the values of Dd(t
′ + 6), Dq(t
′ + 6),
Dk(t
′+6) and C(t′+6), which allows us to relate the findings in this section to the results
obtained in the previous sections.
5.3 Analyzing the welfare effects
We report in this section the welfare effects of the introduction of a small pay-as-you-go
system. We consider first the case of a defined benefits system and then the one of defined
contributions.
5.3.1 Defined benefits
We compute the equilibrium for ν = 0.01 and compare it with the computed equilibrium
for ν = 0. As explained above, to verify that the change is Pareto-improving we compute
the total welfare changes for the next 6 generations after the introduction of the policy.
The following table reports, for generation t′ + 6, the total change in welfare as well as
its decomposition into the various effects explained in the previous section; the average
change in the capital stock, k, in the land price q and in aggregate consumption C
are also reported in the last three columns. All changes, in this table and the rest of this
section, are reported in percentages; moreover, in order to make the results easier to read,
the percentage changes are multiplied by 102.
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(ζ, π) total change Dk Dq Dd crowding out C k q C
(zero,ind) -5.5 0.58 4.57 -6.73 -3.78 -65.2 -68.5 -18.9
(small,ind) 0.18 -0.61 4.87 -4.03 -0.05 -7.8 -98.4 -7.9
(large,ind) 1.13 -0.56 4.05 -2.37 0.34 -2.1 -99.9 -0.9
(small,pos) 2.10 -1.29 3.29 -0.47 1.01 -2.9 -103.1 -3.7
(large,pos) 2.64 -0.87. 1.02 2.61 0.78 -1.1 -99.5 -0.3
(small,neg) -5.1 0.92 6.01 -9.52 -2.77 -22.0 -84.8 -16.2
(large,neg) -4.5 0.61 8.03 -11.99 -1.91 -12.2 -92.5 -9.5
Table 3: Welfare effects of introducing a defined benefits system
In all the cases reported above where the total welfare change of generation t′ + 6
is positive we do have in fact a Pareto improvement, since both the current old and all
generations in the transition also gain. For instance, for the parameter value (small,ind)
the current old gain 9.4 and the next 6 generations gain (0.2, 0.08, 0.14, 0.17, 0.18, 0.18). The
results for the other cases are similar and not reported.
There are several features of the results which are worth commenting on. Both for
π = ind and π = pos, there is a range of parameters generally considered realistic for
which the introduction of social security is Pareto-improving. This is consistent with our
earlier analysis as these are the cases where consumption when old is more volatile than
consumption when young and they are positively correlated. On the other hand, with no
depreciation shocks, social security is never improving. The reason is that in this case the
old almost always consume more than the young. That is, the marginal utility when old
is only very rarely above the marginal utility when young, and even then the difference is
small, so that transfers from the young to the old are not improving.
To better understand our findings it is useful to consider the various components of the
welfare effects of social security, by looking at the other columns of the table above. Note
first that, in all cases, the welfare effect of the change in the land price (Dq) is positive,
in line with our previous findings, and relatively large. On the other hand the effect of
the transfer induced by the change in the stock of capital (Dk) is negative, with the main
exception being the case of negatively correlated shocks, π = neg (this is in line with our
findings in the previous section, since −fkk and fk are negatively correlated only for π
given by π =neg). Quantitatively this second effect is relatively small. A crucial role in
determining the sign of the total welfare change is played by the direct transfer Dd. As we
saw in Section 3, this effect can only be positive if consumption when old and when young
are positively correlated and consumption when old is sufficiently volatile. This explains
why a welfare improvement is easiest to obtain for π = pos and why it is impossible for
π = neg. It also explains why a sufficiently high size of the depreciation shock ζ is needed
for a positive welfare effects.
Turning then to the crowding out effect, in order to better understand how its sign and
magnitude vary across the different specifications it is useful to consider also the average
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changes in k, q and C reported in the last columns. We see that the crowding out effect
is actually positive in specifications π = ind and π = pos, when ζ is sufficiently high, even
though E0(L(s
t)), equal to the average change in aggregate consumption C, is negative in
all specifications. To understand this, note that the covariance between L(st) and u′(co(st))
is likely to be positive. L(st) is approximately k(st−1)fk(s
t) −k(st); since on average
k is negative, in states where the old are relatively poor and u′(co) is large, fk is low and
hence the term k(st−1)fk(s
t) is also large. Thus whenever the reduction in C is small, the
crowding out effect may actually be positive.
We also see that in specifications π = ind and π = pos, when ζ is sufficiently high,
the smaller decrease in C is associated with a significantly smaller reduction in the capital
stock than in the other specifications and, at the same time, with a larger drop in the price
of land. Hence, in such situations social security appears to affect much more consumers’
demand for land than that for capital. Intuitively this is due to the fact that in these cases
the returns on capital and land are highly correlated and, being also positively correlated
with the old’s consumption, they are bad hedging instruments; in addition, land is less
risky and could then be viewed a closer substitute to social security. On the other hand, in
specification π = neg land is a much better hedging instrument than capital, since its return
tends to be negatively correlated with the old’s consumption; hence a closer substitute of
social security in this case is an appropriate combination of land and capital and we see
that consumers’ response to social security is to reduce significantly not only their demand
for land but also their demand for capital.17 In addition, the economy is much farther away
from the golden rule, therefore the effects of changes in k are also stronger.
5.3.2 Defined contributions
We consider now the effects of introducing a defined contribution system. Since the equi-
librium wages lie around 2.5-3 in most of the examples considered, to make the size of
the system which is introduced comparable to the one of the previous section, we set the
contribution rate at 0.35 per cent, i.e. ν = 0.0035. The following table reports again the
effects for generation t′ + 6 :
17Similarly, in specification (ζ, π) = (zero,ind), in contrast to (small,ind) and (large,ind), capital and land
are somewhat equally risky and hence the consumers’ response is to reduce both their demand for capital
and land.
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(ζ, π) total change Dk Dq Dd crowding out C
(zero,ind) -6.95 0.79 5.62 -8.46 -4.64
(small,ind) -0.40 -0.36 5.76 -5.53 -0.31
(large,ind) 0.35 -0.30 4.96 -4.23 0.33
(small,pos) 0.72 -0.68 5.30 -4.05 0.31
(large,pos) 1.01 -0.42 4.12 -2.71 0.33
(small,neg) -2.99 0.34 5.10 -6.88 -1.42
(large,neg) -2.32 0.24 6.21 -8.13 -1.01
Table 4: Welfare effects of introducing a defined contributions system
Just as in the previous section, in all cases where the total change is positive, the current
old and all future generations gain from an introduction of social security. Comparing the
table above with the previous one, we see that now it is slightly more difficult to obtain
an improvement than in the case of defined benefits. The pattern of the welfare changes
as well as of their components across the different specifications is largely analogous to the
defined benefit case.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
We discuss in this section how sensitive our findings are with respect to the specification of
the preference parameters σ (coefficient of relative risk aversion) and β (discount factor),
as well as some technology parameters. We consider the values σ ∈ {0.5, 2, 4} and β =
{0.44, 1}, as we already did in Section 5.1.1. These values cover the ranges considered
realistic in the literature.
The analysis above showed that the higher the depreciation shock ζ, the more likely it
is that the introduction of a social security system is Pareto improving. Hence here, for
any given specification of the preference parameters (σ, β) ∈ {0.5, 2, 4} × {0.44, 1} and the
probabilities π = ind,pos,neg, we search for the smallest value of ζ ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 2} for
which the introduction of social security constitutes a Pareto-improvement in the implied
economy. If there is no improvement for ζ = 2, we report "> 2". The following table shows
the results for the different specifications of (σ, β) and π = ind,pos:
Defined benefits
π\(σ, β) (0.5,1) (2,1) (4,1) (0.5,0.44) (2,0.44) (4,0.44)
ind > 2 1.0 0.5 > 2 1.4 0.7
pos 1.9 0.5 0.3 > 2 0.8 0.4
Defined contributions
π\(σ, β) (0.5,1) (2,1) (4,1) (0.5,0.44) (2,0.44) (4,0.44)
ind > 2 1.3 0.6 > 2 1.6 0.8
pos > 2 0.7 0.4 > 2 0.9 0.5
Table 5: Threshold of ζ for which SS is improving
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The table shows that a higher degree of risk aversion always helps, as the set of values
of ζ for which social security is improving expands, while a higher discount rate slightly
hurts. The positive role of σ is not surprising: improvements in risk sharing have a larger
welfare effect for higher σ. Furthermore, in line with what we found earlier, we see that
with defined contributions it is a bit more difficult to have an improvement, but it seems
that for higher risk aversions the difference becomes very small. Note in particular, that
for a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4 and π = pos an improvement is possible in an
economy with only very modest depreciation shocks, where δs ∈ {0.6, 1.2} for all s.
For the specification π = neg we find that an improvement is not possible in any of the
cases considered, and this even when risk aversion is low. The welfare effect of the direct
transfer proves to be always significantly negative, which should also reflect the fact that
the economy is in these cases rather far from the golden rule. In fact, for ζ = 1, we obtain
Dl = 10.07, Dk = 0.40 and Dd = −13.05. As before, the direct effect is crucial for the
overall welfare effect.
We perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the variance of the TFP shock, ξ.
We consider the case ξ1 = ξ2 = 1.08, ξ3 = ξ4 = 0.92, where the TFP shock has a lower
variance. We find that both with defined benefits and with defined contribution, it is a bit
more difficult to obtain an improvement, but the differences are quantitatively quite small.
For defined benefits, with σ = 2, β = 1 and π = ind an improvement is obtained for all
ζ > 1.05 (while for δ = 0.9 and improvement was already possible for ζ = 1). The results
for other specifications are very similar.
We also perform sensitivity analysis with respect to average depreciation, δ. Again it
is a bit more difficult to obtain an improvement when δ is smaller, but for δ = 0.8 the
difference is quantiatively very small. For defined benefits, with σ = 2, β = 1 and π = pos
an improvement is obtained for all ζ > 0.7
Finally, we carry out a sensitivity analysis with respect to the capital share α. Holding
the land share, 1 − α − γ fixed, the results are robust with respect to small variations in
α and γ. As the capital share increases, the crowding out effect becomes stronger and
therefore the positive welfare effects smaller. For α larger than 0.3, positive welfare effects
are fairly difficult to obtain. For example, for α = 0.33, with σ = 2, β = 1 and π = pos
an improvement is obtained for defined benefits only for ζ > 1.3. The results for other
specifications are very similar. Smaller α, on the other hand, make welfare improvements
easier.
6 Optimal Design of Social Security
In this section, we investigate how an ideal social security system, characterized by station-
ary transfers from the young to the old, looks like both in terms of the size of the system
and in terms of the pattern of the transfer across states. We focus on the benchmark case
of the preference parameters: σ = 2, β = 1 and (ζ, π) = (small,ind), where depreciation
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shocks are relatively small and independent of TFP shocks. We also evaluate the welfare
gains of reforming the social security system, switching from an optimal (in terms of size)
defined benefits system to an optimally designed ideal system.
As Table 3 above already showed, the potential welfare gains for a defined benefits
social security system are very small in the case of independent shocks to depreciation and
to total factor productivity and of relatively small depreciation shocks, as in (small,ind).
Searching over ν ∈ {0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.1} it turns out that in this case the optimal (in terms
of maximizing welfare of future generations) size of the system is ν = 0.06, i.e., since
average wages are around 2.85 on average, a transfer of 2 percent of average wages. Welfare
gains (in percent18) for the current old are 0.512 and for the next six generations are
(0.089, 0.016, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005, 0.005), i.e. generations in the far future gain around 5/1000
of a percent. This seems still quite small, but one has to be a bit cautious in interpreting
absolute numbers in this example since it is not meant to be a realistically calibrated model.
In addition, for other specifications the optimal size of a defined benefit system turns out to
be much larger, for instance for (ζ, π) = (small,pos) and (ζ, π) = (large,ind) we find that
it is equal to, respectively, 12 percent and 11 percent of average wages, that is roughly the
size of the current US system.
Let us turn next to analyzing the optimal reform of the system. Instead of making
a transfer equal to 0.06 units of consumption whatever the realization of the shock, one
could ask how a transfer with the same expected value could be optimally designed as a
function of the different shocks’ realizations. From the above analysis it seems that making
a transfer of 0.24 units when the worst output shock occurs and zero otherwise might be
a good candidate for an optimal system. This turns out to be correct. Searching over the
grid
{ν ∈ {0, 0.01, ..., 0.24}4 :
4∑
s=1
νs = 0.24},
we find that the optimal system, restricted to paying a total of 0.24 units of consumption
across the four states, is to make a transfer only in state 3, i.e. when there is both a large
negative depreciation shock and a negative TFP shock. Welfare gains for this system are
much larger than for defined benefits: they are (again in percent) 1.16 for the current old
and (1.13, 1.36, 1.43, 1.46, 1.47, 1.47) for the subsequent generations, i.e. they are about a
factor 200 larger than in the defined benefits case. It is also interesting to observe that
the welfare gains do not sharply decrease over time, as in the case of defined benefits, but
actually slightly increase. This suggests that in such case we have a significant, permanent
improvement in intergenerational risk sharing.
Finally we ask how an optimally designed social security system looks like, when we
also let the size of the system vary. We search then over a grid ν ∈ {0, 0.01, ..., 1.0}4
without imposing any constraint now on
∑4
s=1 νs. Given our discussion in the previous
18 In comparing welfare changes to the ones of the previous section, we should bear in mind that there,
unlike here, the reported numbers are changes in percent, multiplied by 102.
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sections, it seems natural to conjecture that now the system should involve transfers in
both states where there is a negative depreciation shock since in both such states the
marginal utility when old is likely to be larger than the marginal utility when young. We
find that indeed the optimal social security system is given by a transfer equal to 0.61 units
(17 percent of average wages) in the state where there are a negative depreciation shock
and a negative TFP shock and 0.42 units in the state with a negative depreciation and
positive TFP shocks. In this case, the welfare gains in percent are given by 4.8 for the
current old and (3.0, 3.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.2, 3.3) for the future generations, that is twice as large
as in the intermediate case above. Thus with the introduction of an optimally designed
system generations far in future will gain around 3.3 percent.
7 Conclusion
The idea that a pay-as-you-go social security system can lead to enhanced intergenerational
risk sharing has been formalized in various papers (see the literature review in the introduc-
tion). However, it is also well known that the general equilibrium effects of social security
lead to lower capital formation and hence lower consumption for future generations if the
economy is dynamically efficient. In most quantitative studies this second effect seems to
overcompensate any beneficial effects of enhanced risk sharing.
We show that the presence of a durable good like land as an additional factor of pro-
duction mitigates the crowding out effect and that intergenerational risk-sharing provides
a normative justification of a pay-as-you-go social security system even if one takes into
account the effects on the capital stock and equilibrium prices and if markets are complete.
It is crucial to note that in our framework social security is only desirable under an ex-ante
welfare criterion: in the economies considered competitive equilibria are in fact always in-
terim efficient, the only possibility for an improvement is then due to agents’ inability to
trade before their birth, which prevents the attainment of efficient intergenerational risk
sharing.19 We also show that the welfare gains from an optimal design of a social security,
where contribution rates and benefits are state contingent, can be quite large.
Of course, our results should be interpreted cautiously: our model is missing many
important ingredients, in particular, endogenous labor supply, population growth and tech-
nological progress and since it is a two period model, a proper calibration to the data turns
out to be not possible.
19Under an interim criterion the presence of land tends to decrease rather than increase the scope for
social security because it provides an important tool for self-insurance.
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Appendix
Details on computations
In Sections 5 and 6 we seek to find an admissible range for the capital stock  ⊂ R++ as
well as functions from the current shock and the beginning of period capital stock to land
prices and investments, ρq :  × S → R+, ρk :  × S →  such that for all shocks s ∈ S
and all k− ∈  the following inequalities hold for small ǫ ≥ 0
‖ − 1 + β
∑
s∈S πsfk(ρk(k, s), 1, 1; s)
v′(cos)
u′(cy)‖ < ǫ
‖ − ρq(k, s) + β
∑
s∈S πs(ρq(ρk(k, s), s) + fb(ρk(k, s), 1, 1; s))
v′(c0s)
u′(cy)‖ < ǫ,
(A.1)
where cy = fl(k, 1, 1; s)−ρk(k, s)−ρq(k, s) and c
o
s = ρk(k, s)fk(ρk(k, s), 1, 1; s)+ρq(ρk(k, s), s),
for all s ∈ S; fb(ρk(k, s), 1, 1; s)) ≡
∂f(ρk(k,s),1,1;s)
∂b
. The terms on the left hand side of (A.1)
constitute the first order conditions for a competitive equilibrium without social security;
suitably modified expressions hold in the case where a social security system is present.
We use a collocation algorithm as described for example in Krueger and Kubler (2004) to
approximate these functions numerically. For this, we write ρk and ρq as cubic splines (i.e.
piece-wise cubic polynomials) with 200 collocation points. We solve for the unknown spline
coefficients using time-iteration, i.e. given an approximation for ρk and ρq next period, ρ
N
k
and ρNq , we solve for optimal choices and prices the current period on a grid of 200 points
and interpolate the solution to obtain new functions ρN+1k and ρ
N+1
q . This procedure is
repeated until for some N ,
‖ρ
N
q − ρ
N−1
q ‖∞ + ‖ρ
N
k − ρ
N−1
k ‖∞ < 10
−10.
With the candidate function ρ
N
q and ρ
N
k , we determine the error in the above system of
equations. If ǫ < 10−5, we accept this as an approximate solution and report equilibrium
prices and welfare levels for this approximation.
Welfare computations
As already said in Section 5.2, we suppose that social security is introduced, unantici-
pated, at some time t′ + 1 for all possible realizations of the shocks, 1, ..., 4, i.e. at nodes
(st
′
, 1), ..., (st
′
, 4). Let ∼cy, ∼co denote the equilibrium consumption levels in the economy
with social security and cy, co the consumption levels in the economy without social se-
curity. Given our assumption of CRRA utility functions, the welfare change for the ini-
tial old, in wealth equivalent terms (i.e. the percentage change  in consumption, uni-
form across all states, making agents indifferent between ∼co and co(1 + )) is given by(∑
s∈S πs(∼c
o(st
′
,s))1−σ∑
s∈S πs(c
0(st
′
,s))1−σ
) 1
1−σ
−1. The welfare change for a generation born T generations after
the introduction of social security T = 0, 1, ... is then given by(∑
st
′+T≻st
′ π(st
′+1+T |st
′
)((∼cy(st
′+1+T ))1−σ + β
∑
s∈S πs(∼c
o(st
′+1+T , s))1−σ)∑
st
′+T≻st
′ π(st′+1+T |st′)((cy(st′+1+T ))1−σ + β
∑
s∈S πs(c
o(st′+1+T , s))1−σ)
) 1
1−σ
− 1.
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